Ukraine is rerouting its enterprise software away from 1C/BAS

Strategic dependencies rarely disappear when governments announce that they should. They disappear when organizations reroute data, money, contracts and daily work through a replacement system. Ukraine’s effort to move away from 1C/BAS is a useful example of that process in wartime: the legal route has changed, but parts of the operational route still run through legacy enterprise software.

Public job advertisements provide the clearest signals. Military Unit A5118 sought an accountant in March with 1C, 1C Accounting and BAS skills. Military Unit A4640 also requested experience with 1C and BAS for an accounting leadership role. A Kyiv regional territorial recruitment and social support center listed familiarity with software such as 1C as an advantage.

These ads do not prove the architecture of Ukraine’s defense networks. They reveal something narrower and strategically important: financial and administrative workflows still value knowledge of the legacy ecosystem. That can mean active use, transition support, historical data access or integration with systems that have not yet been replaced. Each scenario creates a dependency that needs to be mapped before it can be removed.

Diia adds a symbolic layer. A June 25 vacancy in the flagship digital-government project’s finance and economics team expected strong 1C, BAS or comparable ERP proficiency. The position did not describe the mobile app’s software stack. Diia separately recruits mobile, infrastructure, systems and security engineers. The evidence therefore points to an internal finance route, not the technology used to deliver documents and online services to citizens.

Ukraine’s regulatory route is clearer. SSSCIP explicitly discusses 1C and BAS in its guidance for the official prohibited-software list. Their inclusion is tied to the sanctioned rights holder, 1C LLC. The agency stresses that the list implements sanctions policy rather than acting as a technical vulnerability ranking. That distinction matters because strategic decoupling is partly about who controls a supply chain, not only whether a specific exploit has been published.

For systems handling state information resources, official information, state secrets or critical infrastructure, the restriction is binding. An air gap is not an exemption. Prohibited components can prevent security authorization or lead to loss of approval and mandatory remediation.

The policy route is expanding quickly. On July 17, the list grew from 1,079 to 1,341 software and communications-equipment entries. That growth transforms compliance from a brand-by-brand reaction into a supply-chain problem. Institutions need to know the ownership and deployment of components across their entire technology estate.

The economic route is more difficult. An ERP system connects accounting, payroll, inventory, procurement, reporting and external services. Years of records become attached to its data model and custom configuration. A replacement project must transfer history, reconstruct business logic and prove that the new system produces the same correct financial results before the old one can be retired.

That is why external funding matters. On July 28, IT Ukraine and Germany’s GIZ announced another voucher call to help Ukrainian micro and small businesses replace 1C/BAS with modern ERP platforms. The program turns geopolitical decoupling into an investment program. Rather than simply penalizing the old route, it helps finance the cost of opening a new one.

There is a broader European lesson. Ukraine’s wartime urgency compresses a problem that many governments face more slowly: strategic autonomy depends on mundane enterprise systems as much as on semiconductors, clouds or telecommunications. A state cannot fully control its digital infrastructure if critical administrative processes remain dependent on suppliers it has decided are unacceptable.

The original claim also named Fire Point, a Ukrainian defense-technology manufacturer. MAIR verified the company’s profile but found no independent 1C/BAS evidence in the public vacancies reviewed. That element remains unverified and should not be used to make the structural story more dramatic.

The verified picture is already strategically significant. Ukraine has changed the legal direction of travel, international partners are helping finance alternatives, and hiring data shows where the old path remains embedded. The next measure of success will not be how many products appear on a prohibited list. It will be how many organizations can prove that their data and workflows have actually been rerouted.