Burnham's Economic Plan Faces Rightwing Myths, Keynes Offers Rebuttal
Andy Burnham's first party conference speech as prime minister evoked 1950s and 1960s optimism, but rightwing economic myths about borrowing and markets could derail his project, argues Larry Elliott, who points to Keynes for a rebuttal.
Andy Burnham used his first party conference speech as prime minister to evoke the Britain of the 1950s and 1960s, when working-class families could sense their lives steadily improving. The underlying message was that, given time, he could rekindle that optimism and return the country to how it was before Margaret Thatcher's reforms. Much of what Burnham says is true: the 1980s was a decade of deindustrialisation, asset-stripping and financial deregulation that has shaped modern Britain, and not in a good way.
But according to Larry Elliott, a Guardian columnist, Burnham's project could be derailed by rightwing economic myths that have become entrenched in British political discourse. These myths include the idea that borrowing is inherently bad, that there is such a thing as the «nation's credit card», and that governments cannot buck the markets. Elliott argues that these claims are not only wrong but also historically illiterate, and that they stand in the way of the kind of ambitious public investment Burnham appears to favour.
Elliott points to John Maynard Keynes as the antidote to these myths. Keynes understood that borrowing can be good when it is used to finance productive investment, particularly during periods of economic slack. The notion of a «nation's credit card» is a misleading metaphor: unlike a household, a sovereign government that borrows in its own currency cannot go bankrupt in the same way. And the idea that markets are an immovable force is contradicted by history. Previous governments have successfully defied market expectations when they had a clear economic strategy and the political will to see it through.
The stakes are high for Burnham. If he accepts the rightwing framing that borrowing is always dangerous and that markets must be appeased, he will be unable to deliver the transformative change he promised. The 1980s legacy of deindustrialisation and financial deregulation has left deep scars: regional inequality, stagnant wages and a sense that the economy works for the few rather than the many. Reversing that legacy requires investment in infrastructure, skills and public services, which in turn requires a more sophisticated understanding of public finance than the myths allow.
Elliott's intervention is a reminder that economic policy is not just a technical matter but a battle of ideas. The myths that dominate Westminster and the financial press are not neutral truths; they are political weapons used to constrain what governments can do. Burnham, if he wants to restore the optimism of the post-war decades, will need to take them on directly. That means making the case for borrowing, rejecting the household analogy, and showing that markets can be managed rather than obeyed. Keynes, as Elliott suggests, provides the intellectual toolkit. Whether Burnham has the political courage to use it remains to be seen.
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